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Audi’s (third) introduction to the theory of knowledge is a magnifi-
cent work and an excellent tool. It is very well organized and displays 
much information about a huge amount of epistemological and philo-
sophical problems. If we compare this edition with the previous one 
(2003), we can see that there are now more sections dedicated to 
issues which were not addressed before. We now have sections about 
perceptual justification and perceptual knowledge, internalist and 
externalist versions of virtue epistemology, the value problem, and 
theories of truth. This increase of information and debates makes this 
introduction even more comprehensive and attractive than its ante-
cessors. So if the previous editions were already great in almost every 
aspect, this one is even better. 
Having said that, we must point out that Audi’s book is not for the 
fainted of heart, nor it is really a simple introduction to epistemology 
stricto sensu, at least not as we construe a simple introduction (see, for 
example, Lemos, N., An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, 
New York, 2007; and Pritchard, D., What is This Thing Called 
Knowledge, Oxon, 2006). Comprehensiveness has often costs for the 
beginner. The high amount of information displayed in Audi’s work 
may be useful for a number of reasons, but has a serious downside: it 
is hard to cope with (perhaps even to people with some experience). 
We are talking about valuable and wide-ranging information, no 
doubt, but when confronted by it, the reader may very well feel a bit 
intimidated. This and the inherent complexities associated with the 
topics at hand may difficult things for the reader with no previous 
contact with those topics. And since Audi is a philosopher within the 
analytical tradition, he strives to do the analysis of almost every 
concept he presents. Furthermore, an argument looms in every page 
(or on most of the pages). Perhaps this is a good strategy. Some may 
be charmed by the book style and passionately read it from the first to 
the last page, but some may feel frightened and leave it on the library. 
Be as it may, one thing is quite certain: this introduction is not for the 
masses, in the sense that it is not exactly easy for the layman to read 
and understand. 
As before, Audi’s introduction to the content of the book is in fact 
a small introduction to the theory of knowledge. It is a classical 
Book Reviews 541 
ouverture ranging over traditional problems in the area: What can we 
know? What are the sources of evidence, justification, knowledge 
and, ultimately, truth? What can and should we believe given the 
available evidence? What grounds and justifies our beliefs? And so 
forth. Argumentative answers to these questions are given across the 
volume. This is why we think that Audi’s work is also an introductory 
theory of knowledge rather than just an introduction to the theory of 
knowledge.  
Another aspect worth mentioning is that this book is not only an 
introduction to the theory of knowledge but also an introduction to 
the theory of justification. 
One must not be surprised by this, given that the knowledge issues 
and the justification issues have been linked for so long in the history 
of philosophy (since Plato, according to many specialists), and chiefly 
in the second half of the twentieth century, because of the well-
known Gettier Problem. As in his earlier works on justification, and 
following a long standing trend in epistemology, Audi main concern 
lies on the grounding of belief. The debate over what appropriately 
grounds belief cut-crosses the entire work and, in one way or anoth-
er, drives the author’s pencil, motivations and arguments. So just like 
Chisholm’s three theories of knowledge (but mostly the first two), 
Audi’s introduction is also a state of the art manual about evidence 
and justification. If nothing else was good, just that would be a suffi-
cient reason to get the book. But since almost everything else is good, 
this is a plus for the lucky reader.   
Now, since we are challenged by an extensive and wide-ranging 
work, it is impossible to comment on everything. So we chose to 
stress only what seems to us excellent and what, in our opinion, is 
not so good. 
Concerning Part One, on the sources of knowledge, the presenta-
tion about the available theories of perception is very good indeed. It 
is exhaustive and has the right sequence. It allows the reader to un-
derstand quite well the problems surrounding perception (mostly 
vision) and the importance of this source in the economics of 
knowledge and justification. And the same can be said about the 
memory presentation. The theoretical resemblance of the theories of 
perception and the theories of memory is used to facilitate the expla-
nation and the understanding. And the section about introspection is 
perfectly structured as well. Here (p. 91) we find a first approach to 
 Book Reviews   542 
the solipsism problem and, of course, to skepticism about the exist-
ence of other minds.  
The first section about reason (5) is excellent because of the over-
all quality of the presentation, but mainly because it allows the reader 
to cope with traditionally hard problems about truths of reason. The 
distinction between necessary, analytic, a priori, and synthetic propo-
sitions (according to the way they are or the way they are grasped) is 
very useful. Though a bit technical, the given explanation on these 
‘modalities’ can help the beginner to deal with the tremendous 
amount of complications usually steaming for philosophy of language, 
metaphysics and epistemology. On the other hand, the second section 
about reason (6) will be for sure very useful to instructors and non-
beginner students. It is a natural follow up of its antecessor, going 
deeper inside the matters of definition and of hybrid propositions 
(e.g., analytic a priori). It is even possible to find on a graphic (see 
Figure 6.1., p. 139) a typology of the classic and revised views about 
these combinations. The attention placed on the a priori, generally 
conceived, and on the a priori justification, is extensive (see Figure 
6.2., p. 144). Again, by reading this section one can ‘fell’ the influen-
tial role that philosophy of language and metaphysics take in the 
epistemological debate. 
On the section about testimony as a source of knowledge we can 
find a good debate over the issue of whether or not testimony is 
indeed a basic source for knowledge and justification (p. 159). Audi 
argues that it is not (p. 161), but stresses the relevance of testimonial 
grounds for belief justification and, therefore, to many belief-
candidates to knowledge. Also interesting and well put is the view 
that though testimony is not a basic source of knowledge it is a prime-
val source of knowledge. 
Concerning Part Two. First a comment on the inference and the 
extension of knowledge section (8). We would like to underline the 
intrinsic difficulty of this section. As we said earlier, Audi’s book may 
be harsh to the novice and the layman. Let me illustrate with a pas-
sage: 
Suppose we conceive his reasoning as deductive, say because Luigi’s un-
derlying principle—roughly, the one by which his reasoning is actually 
guided—is not the expected inductive one—that all if all As are Bs and x 
is a B  of a kind that might well be expected to be an A then probably x is 
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an A—but the false principle that if all As are Bs, and x is a B of a kind that 
might be expected to be an A, then x is (certainly) an A. (p. 188) 
This is a bit difficult to follow, but maybe this particular explanation 
could not be done otherwise. Nevertheless, it is comprehensiveness 
at the cost of simplification.  
One crucial notion about inference entertained by Audi along the-
se pages is that inference is not a basic source of justification of 
knowledge or justification. According to him, inference is just a way 
to transmit them, but in order for the transmission to occur the 
starting premises must already be justified and knowledge (p. 191). 
And yet another important moment of his assessment of these matters 
has to do with the way that deductive inferences are valid and induc-
tive inferences are ‘good’. All of this is very well explained and 
argued for, so we encourage the reader to try reading these chapters, 
regardless of their difficulty.  
 The second section of Part Two is dedicated to the old subject 
of how the knowledge belief candidates must be related in order to be 
justified and knowledge. The section (9) is dubbed the architecture of 
knowledge, and it is as its predecessors very comprehensive and in-
formative. Here Audi deals with the various hypotheses available 
concerning the shape of the chain of beliefs (and justifications). His 
evaluation goes beyond the usual quadripartite account of the chain: 
foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism and skepticism (the latter if 
the chain of beliefs ends in a belief which is not knowledge or it is not 
in any way justified). At the end, Audi takes a non-neutral stance 
towards the problem, arguing for what it is there called moderate 
foundationalism. He thinks that this sort of foundationalism has less 
problems (or easier to solve problems) than the other hypotheses, 
mainly coherentism, and so it is preferable to them. 
In the Part Three of introduction we find a conflation of several 
themes. The first section (10) concerns the problem of the analysis of 
knowledge. Here we can see that Audi still (considering his previous 
works on the subject) embraces the idea that knowledge is some sort 
of reliably formed, properly grounded, true belief (see p. 291). One 
must do justice to the author and say that he does not intend to offer 
an analysis, and that he warn us about the problems faced by any 
candidate to a successful analysis. He explicitly claims that he is not 
offering an analysis of knowledge but a conception of knowledge (see 
note 20, p. 294). But he also leaves an open door for the analysis 
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possibility (see the same note), and his so-called conception of 
knowledge very much seems a disguised analysis of knowledge. Now, 
if there is a lesson (familiar to Audi, for sure) to be extracted from 
the aftermath of the Gettier prominent paper is that no analysis of ‘S 
knows that p’ in terms of ‘true justified (plus condition c) belief’ will 
do the job, i.e., will satisfied all the theoretical and epistemic desidera-
ta for a successful analysis. Furthermore, there is little information on 
Williamson’s arguments (in our view decisive) against the possibility 
of such a successful analysis. All this seems to go against Audi’s posi-
tion concerning this theme.   
The second section (11) of Part Three returns to the subject of 
justification and its origins. Here Audi engages the topics of 
internalism and externalism (about justification and about 
knowledge). He introduces a new subsection devoted to intellectual 
virtues and their role in the internalist-externalist divide. The follow-
ing debate over the value of knowledge is also a novelty in his theory 
of knowledge. Broadly speaking, he holds that knowledge is more 
valuable than true belief simpliciter or than justified true belief. He 
thinks that the latter is valuable because of pragmatic reasons, chiefly 
because justified true belief, whether or not knowledge, may always 
contribute to understanding and perhaps to other cognitive achieve-
ments. We think this can be disputed. It may be argued, for example, 
that justified true belief which is not knowledge cannot be treasured in 
light of the problems which preclude that it is knowledge. Luckily 
justified true beliefs and justified fortuitously true beliefs can hardly 
be valuable, unless they are taken as a crucial element of a cognitive 
process. This may happen, but it is not the rule, so we think that 
Audi’s argument here is far from being convincing. 
Yet in this section we get some information about truth. The main 
theories of truth are introduced with simplicity but also with efficien-
cy. The reader becomes more acquainted with a crucial element 
associated with knowledge that theorists often leave outside their 
debates or take as peripheral, mostly because they think that truth is a 
subject for metaphysics and philosophy of language, rather than for 
epistemology. At the end, Audi declares (p. 290) that the best choice 
for those (like him, so it seems) that embrace an account of 
knowledge as reliably grounded belief is a moderate account of truth 
as correspondence. Again, this shows that we are not, for the best or 
the worst, face to face with a neutral introduction to the theory of 
knowledge. The reader is allowed to choose his path, but the presen-
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tation is argumentative towards specific conceptions of truth, 
knowledge and justification. 
Section 12 is dedicated to introduce the specific proprieties and 
problems of three types of knowledge: the scientific, the moral and 
the religious. The presentation is broad but very enlightening, allow-
ing once more the reader to become quite well acquainted with the 
basics. But once again it is argumentative here and there, trying to 
convince the reader about a particular view. For example, in the 
debate over whether or not religious knowledge (knowledge of the 
divinities and their deeds) is possible (p. 320), Audi clearly assumes 
the role of the religious paladin, seeking to defend the possibility of 
that kind of knowledge. He argues for the plausibility of his own so-
called experincialism, a sort of direct acquaintance of the mind with 
religious truths or facts. This should not be by itself a reason to criti-
cize Audi’s work, but one cannot escape the thought that maybe an 
introduction to the theory of knowledge is not the right place to 
defend our own religious preferences, even if supported by argu-
ments.  
Audi ends the volume with two amazing chapters about skepti-
cism. He is not a skeptic, as we saw before, and that becomes very 
clear on these chapters. He deals perfectly well with the main issues 
around fallibility and error, epistemological relativism and the differ-
ence between common sense views of knowledge and hypothetic 
skeptical scenarios.  
Audi’s book is the best and most complete introductory work to 
the theory of knowledge we have read so far. We think that it is an 
indispensable piece on the bookshelves of every instructor of episte-
mology and a fine acquisition to those who wish to enter deep into 
the subjects of knowledge and justification.  
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